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Abstract 
The feeling of controlling events through one's actions is fundamental to human 
experience, but its neural basis remains unclear.  This "sense of agency" can be 
measured quantitatively as a temporal linkage between voluntary actions and their 
external effects.  We investigated the brain areas underlying this aspect of action 
awareness by using theta-burst stimulation to locally and reversibly disrupt human 
brain function.  Disruption of the pre-Supplementary Motor Area (a key structure for 
preparation and initiation of voluntary action) was shown to reduce the temporal 
linkage between a voluntary keypress action and a subsequent electrocutaneous 
stimulus.  In contrast, disruption of sensorimotor cortex, which processes signals 
more directly related to action execution and sensory feedback, had no significant 
effect. Our results provide the first direct evidence of a pre-SMA contribution to sense 
of agency. 
 
 
Key words: Voluntary action; Agency; Pre-Supplementary Motor Area; 
Sensorimotor cortex; Theta-burst stimulation; Transcranial magnetic stimulation 
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Introduction 
The ability to plan and control actions in order to achieve desired goals is a hallmark 
of human and animal intelligence.  In humans, at least, such operant actions also 
produce a characteristic conscious experience of controlling external events, called 
“sense of agency” (SoA).  
 
Several studies have sought to identify the brain circuits underlying SoA.  Most have 
manipulated the sensory feedback associated with action, and asked subjects to 
explicitly judge whether they are the agent responsible for the feedback or not.  The 
inferior parietal cortex is activated in these explicit attributions of agency (e.g. 
Chaminade & Decety, 2002; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2008).  Moreover, 
patients with damage to the parietal cortex perform poorly on tasks where they are 
asked to judge if visual feedback corresponds to their own action or not (Sirigu, 
Daprati, Pradat-Diehl, Franck, & Jeannerod, 1999). However, parietal regions seem to 
be concerned more with non-agency in cases of incongruent feedback (“that was not 
me”) than with the positive experience of agency itself.   Furthermore the explicit 
judgements of agency used in such tasks may involve different processes from the 
background feeling, or sense, of agency that accompanies our normal voluntary action 
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). 
 
Implicit measures provide an alternative way of quantifying SoA, and may be better 
suited to capturing this background feeling about one’s own action (Synofzik et al., 
2008). Such measures are implicit in that participants do not make explicit attributions 
or judgements of agency.  A number of implicit measures of the SoA have been 
proposed, including the attenuation of self-produced sensations (Blakemore, Wolpert, 
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& Frith, 2000) and changes of time perception associated with voluntary movement.  
Here we focus on the latter.  
 
When a voluntary action is followed by a sensory effect, there is subjective 
compression of the interval between the two events.  In one paradigm, participants are 
asked to estimate the time of the action, or the time of a subsequent tone, in separate 
blocks (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002).  Actions are perceived as shifted later in 
time towards the tone, in comparison to a baseline condition in which subjects’ 
actions do not produce tones.  A tone that follows an action is perceived as shifted 
earlier towards the action that causes it, relative to a baseline condition involving 
tones but no actions (Haggard et al., 2002; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003).  These shifts 
were found for voluntary actions but not for involuntary movements (Haggard et al., 
2002) or pairings of two sensory events (Haggard, Aschersleben, Prinz, & Gehrke, 
2002; Stetson, Cui, Montague, & Eagleman, 2006) suggesting a mechanism specific 
to intentional action.  A similar compression is found if participants judge the interval 
between action and tone, rather than the time of each event individually (Engbert, 
Wohlschläger, Thomas, & Haggard, 2007; Engbert, Wohlschläger, & Haggard, 2008).  
 
We have investigated the neural substrates involved in sense of agency by measuring 
the effects of locally disrupting brain activity on this “intentional binding” effect. We 
used non-invasive continuous theta-burst brain stimulation (cTBS), a protocol that has 
consistently been shown to inhibit neural activity in the target brain region (Huang & 
Rothwell, 2004; Huang, Edwards, Rounis, Bhatia, & Rothwell, 2005; Huang, Chen, 
Rothwell, & Wen, 2007). Two candidate brain regions were selected: The 
sensorimotor hand area (SMHA), and the pre-Supplementary motor area (pre-SMA). 
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The SMHA is primarily concerned with motor execution and sensorimotor feedback 
(e.g. Weiller et al., 1996), while the pre-SMA is involved in the more cognitive 
aspects of internal movement generation (Picard & Strick, 2001), and with the 
conscious urge to act (Fried et al., 1991). In this way, both target regions are plausibly 
neural substrates of SoA, but are distinguishable in terms of both their function and 
time of contribution. Thus, any change in the intentional binding effect resulting from 
disrupting either one of these areas would help to identify what neural signals may 
underlie SoA.  These disruptions can be compared to the effects of stimulation of a 
control site not likely to be involved in SoA, but generating the same non-specific 
effects of TMS, such as arousal, auditory and cutaneous stimulation.  If cTBS over 
either pre-SMA or SMHA significantly alters binding, we may infer that the relevant 
brain area contributes to SoA.  Further, if  cTBS at both sites significantly alters 
binding we may compare the deficits across the two stimulation sites to establish the 
relative contributions of each.  However, this analysis would make sense only after 
showing that both areas contribute to binding. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
10 right-handed individuals (5 females; mean age 25.20 years) took part with ethics 
committee approval, in three sessions on separate days.  Participants were screened 
before entry into the experiment to ensure they showed an intentional binding effect 
(Haggard et al., 2002). Of 20 participants initially screened, 16 showed significant 
binding for actions and 17 showed significant binding for effects. We selected the 13 
participants who showed significant binding for both actions and effects (see 
Procedure: Behavioural test for details of the task). 10 of these 13 participants were 
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recruited in the present experiment (3 were unable to attend follow-up testing).   The 
logic behind this screening is as follows: intervention to disrupt a behavioural effect 
can only sensibly be studied when the effect is present. Since these 10 individuals 
showed evidence of intentional binding, they were particularly appropriate 
participants in our attempt to disrupt intentional binding. By implication our results 
apply to the population of participants showing intentional binding, which may not be 
representative of the population as a whole.  Similar screening has been used in other 
neurophysiological studies of motor representation (e.g. Wolters et al., 2003; Stefan et 
al., 2006). The presence of the binding effect within a wider, unscreened population 
was established in previous studies (Haggard et al., 2002).  
 
Procedure: Behavioural test 
Behavioural testing occurred immediately after cTBS (see Neurophysiological 
methods below for details), and followed previous methods (e.g. Haggard et al., 2002; 
see also Figure 1A for set-up).  Participants were instructed to press a key with their 
right index finger at a time of their choosing.  This caused a cutaneous somatosensory 
stimulus (a mild shock) to the right little finger 250 ms later in agency conditions, but 
not in baseline conditions.  Whereas previous studies used an auditory tone as the 
effect of action (e.g. Moore & Haggard, 2008), we chose to use a somatosensory 
stimulus in this case, so that the key signals for both action and for the effects of 
action would be co-localised in a single brain area (the sensorimotor hand area, 
SMHA).  This increased the likelihood of disrupting neural processing of both action 
and effect signals.  
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While making actions and receiving shocks, participants viewed a clock hand rotating 
with a period of 2560 ms. Following the action and shock delivery, the clock hand 
continued rotating for a random period of time. After the clock stopped the participant 
verbally reported the position of the clock hand at which they pressed the key, or the 
time at which they felt the shock.  Action judgements and shock judgements were 
performed in separate blocks of trials.  In two further baseline blocks, participants 
made actions but never received shocks, or received shocks at a random time, but 
never made actions.  Each block contained 20 trials.  Block order was randomised 
anew for each session (see below).  Testing lasted approximately 15 minutes, well 
within the window of cTBS efficacy (Huang et al., 2005). 
 
Prior to each session, each participant’s detection threshold for cutaneous shocks from 
ring electrodes on the right little finger (one ring electrode placed on the proximal 
phalanx and the other on the middle phalanx) was identified by an ascending staircase 
procedure.  Shock intensity was varied by changing pulse width until the shock was 
detected, then decreased with half the step size until the shock was missed, then 
increased again with further halving of the step size, until the fourth reversal of 
responding (Levitt, 1971). The average of the final two reversals was taken as the 
detection threshold. The experimental shocks used 140% of each participant’s 
detection threshold for that session. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
Neurophysiological methods 
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Subjects sat comfortably in a reclining chair. Surface-electromyography (EMG) was 
recorded from the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) muscle of the right hand using 9 mm 
diameter Ag-AgCl surface electrodes in a belly-tendon montage. The active electrode 
was placed over the belly muscle, the reference electrode over the 
metacarpophalangeal joint of the index finger. Responses were amplified, filtered 
with a 20 Hz-2 kHz passband, and digitally sampled at 5 kHz. 
 
A Super Rapid Magstim package (Magstim Co, Whitland, Dyfedd, UK) was 
connected to a 70 mm figure-of-eight coil. To stimulate primary motor cortex the coil 
was placed tangentially to the skull with the handle pointing backwards and rotated 
45º away from the midline. The optimal coil position (‘hotspot’) for activating the 
contralateral FDI was determined as the site where stimulation at a slightly 
suprathreshold stimulus intensity consistently produced the largest Motor Evoked 
Potential (MEP). We then calculated the Active Motor threshold (AMT) at this 
hotspot, by asking the participant to maintain a slight isometric contraction (5-10% of 
maximum voluntary contraction), and identifying the lowest stimulus intensity which 
elicited a mean MEP > 200µV from at least five of ten consecutive trials (Rossini et 
al., 1994). 
 
Thetaburst stimulation (TBS) consists of repeating bursts of TMS, with 3 pulses at 50 
Hz repeated at 200 ms intervals (i.e., at 5 Hz). A train of 600 pulses, termed 
continuous TBS (cTBS), can suppress local cortical excitability for approximately 20-
30 minutes (Huang et al., 2005). Stimulation intensity was set to 80 % of the AMT for 
the FDI muscle at the motor cortex hot spot. All participants had cTBS stimulation at 
three stimulation sites (sensorimotor hand area (SMHA), pre-SMA, S1-leg area) in 
10 
 
 
separate sessions in a random order. Participants were not informed of the specific 
stimulation site at each session. No adverse consequences of cTBS occurred.  For 
SMHA stimulation the optimal stimulation site to evoke MEPs in the FDI muscle was 
used. To target pre-SMA a site 4 cm anterior to the hotspot of the FDI was marked in 
the sagittal midline (Cz of the international 10-20-EEG system) of the scalp 
(Rushworth, Hadland, Paus, & Sipila, 2002; Mars et al., 2009). In one participant, 
bilateral twitches in the leg muscles were evoked at this location by high stimulation 
intensity (90% maximal stimulator output). The coil was then moved 0.5 cm more 
anteriorly so that twitches no longer occurred.  To target the S1-leg area as a control 
site, a position 2 cm posterior to the hot spot for the FDI muscle in the sagittal midline 
of the skull was marked on the scalp. 
 
The location of the scalp stimulation sites with respect to underlying brain anatomy 
was examined with TMS-MRI co-registration in a separate group of 3 subjects. The 
three stimulation positions used in the main experiment were identified in the same 
way as for the experimental subjects, and marked on each subject's scalp. A high 
resolution three-dimensional volumetric structural magnetic resonance image (MRI) 
was obtained for each subject. The cortical surface was displayed as a three-
dimensional representation using Brainsight Frameless Stereotaxic software (Rogue 
Research, Montreal, Quebec, Canada). Each stimulation site was identified on the 
MRI image using a pointer tool (Brainsight Frameless P-697), while the position of 
the pointer and the subject’s head were monitored using a Polaris Optical Tracking 
system (Northern Digital, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada). One example is shown in 
Figure 1B. The anatomical location of the pre-SMA was identified from the border 
between the SMA proper and the pre-SMA which is defined by the plane 
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perpendicular to the anterior commissure-posterior commissure (AC-PC) line at the 
level of the AC (Picard and Strick, 1996). We could confirm in all 3 subjects that the 
site of TMS stimulation on the scalp lay over the anatomically-defined pre-SMA in 
the brain. 
 
The order of testing sessions was counterbalanced using the Latin square procedure. 
All three of each participants’ testing sessions took place at a similar time of day 
(either am or pm), to minimise circadian effects.  The order of perceptual judgement 
blocks was randomised anew for each session.   
 
Data Analysis 
The perceived time of action or shock on each trial was compared to actual onset 
time, and a mean temporal error calculated for each block.  The mean error for actions 
and shocks in baseline blocks was subtracted from that in experimental blocks.  
Subtracting these baseline estimates allowed us to calculate the shift in the perceived 
time of the action when the shock was present, and the shift in the perceived time of 
the shock when caused by the action.  These shifts serve as measures of ‘intentional 
binding’ between action and effect. By convention a positive temporal shift indicates 
delayed awareness.  Therefore, a positive shift for actions represents binding of 
actions towards shocks, while a negative shift for shocks represents binding of shocks 
towards the preceding action.  Finally, an overall measure of binding between action 
and effect was calculated as action binding minus tone binding.  Larger values of this 
measure indicate stronger action-effect binding.  All data are presented in 
Supplemental Table 1.  
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Controlling for possible cTBS-induced changes in sensory intensity 
CTBS could, in principle, alter somatosensory function, leading to changes in the 
perceived time of shock stimuli.  To control for this possibility, we additionally 
checked whether cTBS affected perceived shock intensity, which could in turn affect 
timing judgements. 
 
Therefore, before each cTBS session, subjects received 5 ‘reference shocks’, triggered 
by their own keypress, and at the same intensity as in the main experiment.  They 
were asked to attend to the intensity of these reference shocks for subsequent 
comparison.  After each block of trials (except the baseline action condition in which 
there were no shocks), participants were asked to compare the shock intensity they 
experienced during the block with the initial reference shocks, using a 7 point scale (-
3 = experimental shocks much less intense than reference, +3 = experimental shocks 
much more intense).  These ratings were averaged across the blocks in each, to give a 
total measure of perceived shock intensity following stimulation at each TMS site (see 
Supplemental Table 1).  
 
Results 
The experience of intentionally controlling shocks changed the perceived time of both 
action and shock.  Overall binding between action and effect is measured by the 
action shift minus the effect shift (Figure 2).  If SoA depends on brain circuits for 
internal generation of action, then overall binding following pre-SMA stimulation 
should be reduced relative to control stimulation.  Alternatively, if SoA depends on 
brain circuits for action execution and somatosensory feedback, then overall binding 
following SMHA stimulation should be reduced relative to control.  Because both 
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areas might make independent contributions, we made no prediction about the 
difference between pre-SMA and SMHA stimulations. 
 
Pre-SMA stimulation indeed reduced the overall amount of binding (118 ms +/-22 ms 
SE) relative to control stimulation of the sensory leg area (153 ms +/-24 ms SE) (2-
tailed paired samples t-test: t(9) = 3.49, p=.007).  Testing each shift separately showed 
that pre-SMA stimulation influenced the shift in perceived time of the effect (2-tailed 
paired samples t-test: t(9) = 2.32, p = .045) but not the shift in action (2-tailed paired 
samples t-test: t(9) = .058, p = 960). Interestingly, the effect of stimulation on our 
composite binding measure is statistically stronger than that on action binding or 
effect binding individually.  This pattern was found because pre-SMA stimulation 
influenced primarily action binding for some subjects, and effect binding for others.  
However, the implied interval between action and effect was influenced with much 
greater reliability than either event individually. 
 
SMHA stimulation had a much smaller influence on overall binding (137 ms +/-31 ms 
SE).  Moreover, this influence was rather variable across individuals, and did not 
differ significantly from control stimulation over the sensory leg area (2-tailed paired 
samples t-test: t(9) = .469, p=.650).  Testing each shift separately revealed that SMHA 
stimulation did not significantly affect either action binding (2-tailed paired samples t-
test: t(9)  = .119, p = .911) or effect binding (2-tailed paired samples t-test: t(9) = 
.758, p = .468).  Since we found no reliable evidence that the SMHA was involved 
binding, we could not proceed to directly compare the magnitudes of the two 
disruptions (see Introduction). 
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We also investigated whether cTBS might affect time perception generally, by 
comparing baseline judgements across the different stimulation conditions. Baseline 
judgements of both actions and effects were unaffected by pre-SMA stimulation 
relative to control site (2-tailed paired samples t-test – baseline action: t(9) = .095, p = 
.926; baseline tone: t(9) = .710, p = .496).   Equally, SMHA stimulation produced no 
change in baseline judgements relative to control site (2-tailed paired samples t-test – 
baseline action: t(9) =.582, p = .575; baseline tone: t(9) = .246, p = .811).  Therefore, 
it seems unlikely that our results are merely an artefact of poor time perception, or 
similar non-specific factors. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Finally, we investigated whether cTBS might have affected perceived shock intensity, 
perhaps leading to differences in perceived timing. We found no differences in 
perceived intensity between control (S1-leg area) and pre-SMA stimulation (2-tailed 
paired samples t-test: t(9) = .483, p = .641), nor between control and SMHA 
stimulation (2-tailed paired samples t-test: t(9) = 1.41, p = .193) (see Supplemental 
Table 1 for data). This suggests that TMS-induced changes in perceptual timing are 
unlikely to be due to changes in perceived intensity. 
 
Discussion 
In this study, we used cTBS to shed light on the neural substrate of SoA. Two 
candidate brain regions were stimulated: pre-SMA and SMHA. The effects of 
stimulating each area on intentional binding (a temporal measure of SoA) were 
compared with stimulation of a control area (sensory leg area).  Following pre-SMA 
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disruption, we found significant reduction in overall intentional binding, and 
particularly in the binding of sensory consequences towards actions. Disruption of 
SMHA with cTBS did not significantly reduce binding relative to control area. 
 
Limitations 
We have used an indirect measure of agency, based on time perception.  In contrast, 
previous studies investigated explicit judgements of agency (Farrer & Frith, 2002).   
Intentional binding is a useful measure of sense of agency to the extent that it occurs 
only in situations that indeed involve agency, i.e. when a self-generated movement 
produces a sensory effect, but not when involuntary movements lead to the same 
effects (Haggard et al., 2002), or where two stimuli co-occur without voluntary action 
(Haggard, Aschersleben, Prinz, & Gehrke, 2002; Stetson, Cui, Montague, & 
Eagleman, 2006).   However, it remains unclear whether intentional binding, and 
sense of agency, always accompanies all self-generated movements.  Several studies 
suggest that binding (Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009; Ebert & Wegner, 2010) and 
action experience in general (Haggard, Cartledge, Dafydd, & Oakley, 2004) can be 
influenced by contextual factors and suggestions about one’s action. 
 
Many studies of voluntary action, including this one, have focussed on the pre-SMA 
(Fried et al., 1991).  Our pre-SMA localisation followed that used successfully in 
previous studies (Rushworth et al., 2002; Mars et al., 2009), and was confirmed by 
neuronavigation in a separate group of three participants.  However, a potential 
limitation of our study is the absence of any functional localiser confirming that our 
cTBS was located over pre-SMA. Therefore, our cTBS could also have affected 
neighbouring regions, such as SMA-proper, so disruption there might underlie our 
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effects. However, the relatively low stimulation intensity of 80% Active Motor 
Threshold makes a contamination of other areas by current spread rather unlikely. Co-
registration of our pre-SMA stimulation site, albeit in a different group of subjects, 
also confirmed that the coil was located anterior to SMA-proper which was defined 
anatomically as being anterior to the plane perpendicular to the AC-PC-line at the 
level of the AC. 
 
A related concern is the possible remote effects of TMS (Bestmann, Baudewig, 
Siebner, Rothwell, & Frahm, 2004). In principle, our pre-SMA results could arise 
from disruption to regions connected to pre-SMA rather than in pre-SMA itself.  This 
possibility cannot be ruled out completely.  The candidate areas for such remote 
effects should be strongly connected to the pre-SMA. The major input to the pre-SMA 
comes from the basal ganglia (Akkal, Dum, & Strick, 2007). The major targets of pre-
SMA output are prefrontal regions (Luppino, Matelli, Camarda, & Rizzolatti, 1993; 
Bates & Goldman-Rakic, 1993; Johansen-Berg et al., 2004), and the basal ganglia 
(Inase, Tokuno, Nambu, Akazawa, & Takada, 1999; Lehéricy et al., 2004). However, 
it is unclear whether disruption of these remote areas would produce changes in SoA. 
A candidate prefrontal region with respect to SoA is the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC). The current literature gives few indications whether remote disruption of 
these areas could be the basis of our findings.  Early imaging studies showed that 
DLPFC activity is greater for active vs. passive movements (e.g. Frith, Friston, 
Liddle, & Frackowiak, 1991), which suggested a role in the initiation of voluntary 
action. However, more recent imaging research suggests that the specific function of 
DLFPC is in the selection between action alternatives, particularly under conflict, 
rather than volition per se (Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 2000). 
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In our study, participants made only one action, so action selection was absent. This 
reduces the putative influence of DLPFC. The basal ganglia (BG) are another possible 
source of remote effects of pre-SMA stimulation. Here it is harder to rule out remote 
effects.  One recent study showed intact intentional binding in patients with 
Parkinson’s Disease (Moore et al., 2010).  While the effects on the BG of Parkinson's 
Disease of pre-SMA cTBS are not directly comparable, this result at least suggests 
that remote BG disruption is unlikely to explain our pre-SMA findings. 
 
The pre-SMA: a premotor contribution to SoA? 
The pre-SMA plays a key role in the initiation and control of voluntary action (Deiber 
et al., 1991; Hikosaka et al., 1996; Nachev, Wydell, O'Neill, Husain, & Kennard, 
2007). Higher order features of motor cognition have also been attributed to the pre-
SMA; direct stimulation of this region produces a conscious ‘urge to move’ (Fried et 
al., 1991), and attending to the intention to move activates this area (Lau, Rogers, 
Haggard, & Passingham, 2004). Taken together these results suggest that the pre-
SMA plays a key role in the experience of volition, by coding the conscious intention 
to move. Our results suggesting that pre-SMA may also contribute to SoA.   Lasting 
disruption of putative pre-SMA significantly weakened a temporal marker of agency, 
namely the perceived association between actions and effects.  
 
Theoretically, SoA could arise from either of two distinct processes.  On the one 
hand, SoA may involve a prediction - based on the neural commands for action - that 
the sensory effect will occur.  On the other hand, the brain might infer, or postdict 
from the conjunction of action and effect (Hume, 1739) that the action caused the 
effect, as in illusions of conscious will (Wegner, 2002). Recent behavioural studies 
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show that the intentional binding effect involves a combination of both processes.  
First, the binding of outcomes towards actions was significantly reduced in blocks 
where additional outcome events could sometimes occur in the absence of action, 
compared to blocks where outcomes occurred only directly after actions.  This 
suggests that outcome binding reflects an inference based on knowledge about the 
distribution of outcomes (Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009).  Second, when 
the outcome following an action was occasionally omitted, a shift in perceived time of 
action towards the predicted tone was nevertheless observed (Moore & Haggard, 
2008).  When both predictive and postdictive information are available, they may be 
combined in a flexible way, according to the availability and reliability of each 
(Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009). 
 
Distinguishing between predictive and postdictive components of SoA requires 
varying the conditional probabilities of tones and actions.  In the present study, 
actions were always followed by shocks in the experimental blocks so both prediction 
and postdiction could have contributed to binding.  Therefore, we cannot conclusively 
determine whether the reduced binding effect caused by pre-SMA stimulation reflects 
a disruption of prediction or of postdiction.  However, a predictive role is more 
consistent with other evidence regarding the role of pre-SMA in action preparation.  
In particular, recordings from pre-SMA have demonstrated its role both in action 
preparation and in anticipatory processing of warning signals prior to action (Ikeda et 
al., 1999).    
 
We found that pre-SMA cTBS disrupted effect binding more than action binding  
Recent computational models also emphasise the role of effect prediction in SoA 
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(Blakemore, Wolpert, &  Frith, 2002)  Specifically, pre-SMA may link intentions to 
the sensory consequences of the intended action, a view which is consistent with 
ideomotor theories of voluntary action (James, 1890). A previous study found that 
disruption of this area abolished sensory suppression during voluntary movement 
(Haggard & Whitford, 2004). In the present study, we showed analogous effects on 
the linkage between action and effect.  Disruption of the pre-SMA reduced the 
tendency to link representations of action and effect across time.  This result suggests 
that the pre-SMA may use motor information to generate predictions of the sensory 
consequences of action.  
 
Care is needed in interpreting our SMHA results.  First, there was some evidence of 
reduced binding following SMHA stimulation, though this was not statistically 
reliable.  In particular, effects of SMHA stimulation were highly variable across 
individuals.  This inter-individual variability presumably did not merely reflect poor 
localisation of SMHA, since objective physiological criteria were used to localise this 
area in each participant. Because we did not find strong evidence for any SMHA role 
in binding, we could not sensibly compare the contributions of pre-SMA and SMHA 
to investigate which was more important.  The absence of any SMHA effect in our 
data could be a simple statistical power limitation, given our relatively small number 
of participants. More research is required to confirm whether SMHA contributes to 
binding or not.  
 
In conclusion, we show that the subjective feeling of control, as indexed by the 
temporal linkage between actions and effects, depends at least partly on the pre-SMA. 
More specifically, we suggest that the pre-SMA makes a special contribution to SoA, 
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housing the predictive mechanisms contributing to the SoA. These results shed light 
on the neural substrate of SoA, and suggest a strong link between SoA, motor 
prediction, and medial premotor cortex. 
21 
 
 
References 
Akkal, D., Dum, R. P., & Strick, P. L. (2007). Supplementary motor area and 
presupplementary motor area: targets of basal ganglia and cerebellar output. The 
Journal of Neuroscience: The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 
27(40), 10659-10673. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3134-07.2007 
Bates, J. F., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1993). Prefrontal connections of medial motor areas in 
the rhesus monkey. The Journal of Comparative Neurology, 336(2), 211-228. doi: 
10.1002/cne.903360205 
Bestmann, S., Baudewig, J., Siebner, H. R., Rothwell, J. C., & Frahm, J. (2004). Functional 
MRI of the immediate impact of transcranial magnetic stimulation on cortical and 
subcortical motor circuits. The European Journal of Neuroscience, 19(7), 1950-1962. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1460-9568.2004.03277.x 
Blakemore, S. J., Wolpert, D., & Frith, C. (2000). Why can't you tickle yourself? 
Neuroreport, 11(11), R11-6. 
Blakemore, S., Wolpert, D., & Frith, C. (2002). Abnormalities in the awareness of action. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(6), 237-242. 
Chaminade, T., & Decety, J. (2002). Leader or follower? Involvement of the inferior parietal 
lobule in agency. Neuroreport, 13(15), 1975-8. 
Deiber, M. P., Passingham, R. E., Colebatch, J. G., Friston, K. J., Nixon, P. D., & 
Frackowiak, R. S. (1991). Cortical areas and the selection of movement: a study with 
positron emission tomography. Experimental Brain Research. Experimentelle 
Hirnforschung. Expérimentation Cérébrale, 84(2), 393-402. 
Ebert, J. P., & Wegner, D. M. (2010). Time warp: Authorship shapes the perceived timing of 
actions and events. Consciousness and Cognition, 19(1), 481-489. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.10.002 
22 
 
 
Engbert, K., Wohlschläger, A., & Haggard, P. (2008). Who is causing what? The sense of 
agency is relational and efferent-triggered. Cognition, 107(2), 693-704. doi: 
10.1016/j.cognition.2007.07.021 
Engbert, K., Wohlschläger, A., Thomas, R., & Haggard, P. (2007). Agency, subjective time, 
and other minds. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and 
Performance, 33(6), 1261-8. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.33.6.1261 
Farrer, C., & Frith, C. D. (2002). Experiencing oneself vs another person as being the cause 
of an action: the neural correlates of the experience of agency. NeuroImage, 15(3), 
596-603. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2001.1009 
Farrer, C., Frey, S. H., Van Horn, J. D., Tunik, E., Turk, D., Inati, S., et al. (2008). The 
angular gyrus computes action awareness representations. Cerebral Cortex (New 
York, N.Y.: 1991), 18(2), 254-61. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhm050 
Fried, I., Katz, A., McCarthy, G., Sass, K. J., Williamson, P., Spencer, S. S., et al. (1991). 
Functional organization of human supplementary motor cortex studied by electrical 
stimulation. The Journal of Neuroscience: The Official Journal of the Society for 
Neuroscience, 11(11), 3656-66. 
Frith, C. D., Friston, K., Liddle, P. F., & Frackowiak, R. S. J. (1991). Willed Action and the 
Prefrontal Cortex in Man: A Study with PET. Proceedings: Biological Sciences, 
244(1311), 241-246. 
Haggard, P. (2008). Human volition: towards a neuroscience of will. Nat Rev Neurosci, 
9(12), 934-946. doi:10.1038/nrn2497 
Haggard, P., Aschersleben, G., Prinz, W., & Gehrke, J. (2002). Action, binding and 
awareness. 
Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness. 
Nature Neuroscience, 5(4), 382-5. doi: 10.1038/nn827 
23 
 
 
Haggard, P., Cartledge, P., Dafydd, M., & Oakley, D. A. (2004). Anomalous control: When 
'free-will' is not conscious. Consciousness and Cognition, 13(3), 646-654. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.06.001 
Haggard, P., & Whitford, B. (2004). Supplementary motor area provides an efferent signal 
for sensory suppression. Brain Research. Cognitive Brain Research, 19(1), 52-58. 
doi: 10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2003.10.018 
Hikosaka, O., Sakai, K., Miyauchi, S., Takino, R., Sasaki, Y., & Pütz, B. (1996). Activation 
of human presupplementary motor area in learning of sequential procedures: a 
functional MRI study. Journal of Neurophysiology, 76(1), 617-21. 
Huang, Y., Chen, R., Rothwell, J. C., & Wen, H. (2007). The after-effect of human theta 
burst stimulation is NMDA receptor dependent. Clinical Neurophysiology: Official 
Journal of the International Federation of Clinical Neurophysiology, 118(5), 1028-
1032. doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.2007.01.021 
Huang, Y., Edwards, M. J., Rounis, E., Bhatia, K. P., & Rothwell, J. C. (2005a). Theta burst 
stimulation of the human motor cortex. Neuron, 45(2), 201-206. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuron.2004.12.033 
Huang, Y., Edwards, M. J., Rounis, E., Bhatia, K. P., & Rothwell, J. C. (2005). Theta burst 
stimulation of the human motor cortex. Neuron, 45(2), 201-6. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuron.2004.12.033 
Huang, Y., & Rothwell, J. C. (2004). The effect of short-duration bursts of high-frequency, 
low-intensity transcranial magnetic stimulation on the human motor cortex. Clinical 
Neurophysiology: Official Journal of the International Federation of Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 115(5), 1069-1075. doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.2003.12.026 
Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford Oxford University Press. 
Ikeda, A., Yazawa, S., Kunieda, T., Ohara, S., Terada, K., Mikuni, N., et al. (1999). 
24 
 
 
Cognitive motor control in human pre-supplementary motor area studied by subdural 
recording of discrimination/selection-related potentials. Brain: A Journal of 
Neurology, 122 ( Pt 5), 915-31. 
Inase, M., Tokuno, H., Nambu, A., Akazawa, T., & Takada, M. (1999). Corticostriatal and 
corticosubthalamic input zones from the presupplementary motor area in the macaque 
monkey: comparison with the input zones from the supplementary motor area. Brain 
Research, 833(2), 191-201. 
James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt. 
Johansen-Berg, H., Behrens, T. E. J., Robson, M. D., Drobnjak, I., Rushworth, M. F. S., 
Brady, J. M., et al. (2004). Changes in connectivity profiles define functionally 
distinct regions in human medial frontal cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States of America, 101(36), 13335-13340. doi: 
10.1073/pnas.0403743101 
Lau, H. C., Rogers, R. D., Haggard, P., & Passingham, R. E. (2004). Attention to intention. 
Science (New York, N.Y.), 303(5661), 1208-10. doi: 10.1126/science.1090973 
Lehéricy, S., Ducros, M., Krainik, A., Francois, C., Van de Moortele, P., Ugurbil, K., et al. 
(2004). 3-D diffusion tensor axonal tracking shows distinct SMA and pre-SMA 
projections to the human striatum. Cerebral Cortex (New York, N.Y.: 1991), 14(12), 
1302-1309. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhh091 
Levitt, H. (1971). Transformed up-down methods in psychoacoustics. The Journal of the 
Acoustical Society of America, 49(2), Suppl 2:467+. 
Luppino, G., Matelli, M., Camarda, R., & Rizzolatti, G. (1993). Corticocortical connections 
of area F3 (SMA-proper) and area F6 (pre-SMA) in the macaque monkey. The 
Journal of Comparative Neurology, 338(1), 114-140. doi: 10.1002/cne.903380109 
Mars, R. B., Klein, M. C., Neubert, F., Olivier, E., Buch, E. R., Boorman, E. D., et al. (2009). 
25 
 
 
Short-latency influence of medial frontal cortex on primary motor cortex during 
action selection under conflict. The Journal of Neuroscience: The Official Journal of 
the Society for Neuroscience, 29(21), 6926-6931. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1396-
09.2009 
Moore, J., & Haggard, P. (2008). Awareness of action: Inference and prediction. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1), 136-44. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2006.12.004 
Moore, J. W., Lagnado, D., Deal, D. C., & Haggard, P. (2009). Feelings of control: 
contingency determines experience of action. Cognition, 110(2), 279-83. doi: 
10.1016/j.cognition.2008.11.006 
Moore, J. W., Schneider, S. A., Schwingenschuh, P., Moretto, G., Bhatia, K. P., & Haggard, 
P. (2010). Dopaminergic medication boosts action-effect binding in Parkinson's 
disease. Neuropsychologia, 48(4), 1125-1132. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.12.014 
Moore, J. W., Wegner, D. M., & Haggard, P. (2009). Modulating the sense of agency with 
external cues. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(4), 1056-1064. doi: 
10.1016/j.concog.2009.05.004 
Nachev, P., Wydell, H., O'neill, K., Husain, M., & Kennard, C. (2007). The role of the pre-
supplementary motor area in the control of action. NeuroImage, 36 Suppl 2, T155-63. 
doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.03.034 
Picard, N., & Strick, P. L. (2001). Imaging the premotor areas. Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology, 11(6), 663-672. 
Rossini, P. M., Barker A.T., Berardelli A., Caramia M.D., Caruso G, Cracco R.Q., et al. 
(1994): Non-invasive electrical and magnetic stimulation of the brain, spinal cord and 
roots: basic principles and procedures for routine clinical application. Report of an 
IFCN committee. Eletroenecephalogr Clin Neurophysiol 91, 79-92 
26 
 
 
Rowe, J. B., Toni, I., Josephs, O., Frackowiak, R. S., & Passingham, R. E. (2000). The 
prefrontal cortex: response selection or maintenance within working memory? 
Science (New York, N.Y.), 288(5471), 1656-1660. 
Rushworth, M., Hadland, K. A., Paus, T., & Sipila, P. K. (2002). Role of the Human Medial 
Frontal Cortex in Task Switching: A Combined fMRI and TMS Study. J 
Neurophysiol, 87(5), 2577-2592. 
Sirigu, A., Daprati, E., Pradat-Diehl, P., Franck, N., & Jeannerod, M. (1999). Perception of 
self-generated movement following left parietal lesion. Brain: A Journal of 
Neurology, 122 ( Pt 10), 1867-74. 
Stefan, K., Wycislo, M., Gentner, R., Schramm, A., Naumann, M., Reiners, K., et al. (2006). 
Temporary Occlusion of Associative Motor Cortical Plasticity by Prior Dynamic 
Motor Training. Cereb. Cortex, 16(3), 376-385. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhi116 
Stetson, C., Cui, X., Montague, P. R., & Eagleman, D. M. (2006). Motor-sensory 
recalibration leads to an illusory reversal of action and sensation. Neuron, 51(5), 651-
659. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2006.08.006 
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., & Newen, A. (2008). Beyond the comparator model: A 
multifactorial two-step account of agency. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1), 219-
239. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.03.010 
Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2003). Awareness of somatic events associated with a voluntary 
action. Experimental Brain Research. Experimentelle Hirnforschung. 
Expérimentation Cérébrale, 149(4), 439-46. doi: 10.1007/s00221-003-1386-8 
Wegner, D. M. (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will (illustrated edition.). MIT Press. 
Weiller, C., Jüptner, M., Fellows, S., Rijntjes, M., Leonhardt, G., Kiebel, S., et al. (1996). 
Brain representation of active and passive movements. NeuroImage, 4(2), 105-110. 
doi: 10.1006/nimg.1996.0034 
27 
 
 
Wolters, A., Sandbrink, F., Schlottmann, A., Kunesch, E., Stefan, K., Cohen, L. G., et al. 
(2003). A Temporally Asymmetric Hebbian Rule Governing Plasticity in the Human 
Motor Cortex. J Neurophysiol, 89(5), 2339-2345. doi: 10.1152/jn.00900.2002 
28 
 
 
Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. A) Experimental set-up used in the study. See text for details. B) Putative 
sites of cTBS stimulation (based on neuro-navigation in a separate group of three 
participants).   
 
Figure 2. A) Upper row: In experimental conditions, actions were followed by shocks 
250 ms later. Lower 3 rows: changes in the perceived time of actions and effects 
following cTBS in each condition. Black circles indicate the mean perceived time of 
actions, dashed vertical lines indicate the baseline judgements of actions in that 
session. Grey triangles indicate the mean perceived time of shocks, dashed vertical 
lines indicate baseline shock judgements in that session.  Numbers indicate the size of 
the shift in ms.  Note the reduced binding following preSMA cTBS. B) Mean overall 
binding between action and effect (action shift minus shock shift) in ms for each site 
of stimulation. Bars represent Standard Error of the mean across participants. 
Asterisks denote significant difference (p<.01) 
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